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Graphs as Images vs Graphs as Diagrams: A Problem at the Intersection of 
Semiotics and Didactics  
 
Michael May, Department of Science Education, University of Copenhagen 
 
Abstract.  Apart from their role in the philosophy of science and philosophical logic Peirce’s 
concepts of diagrammatic reasoning and forms of iconicity are becoming increasingly important 
for didactic and cognitive semiotic studies of science education. One specific problem (“graphs-
as-images”) in students’ graph and model comprehension will be analyzed in the context of 
chemistry and chemical engineering education. Rather than an educational philosophy the long-
term goal of this type of research is to establish a semiotics of science within specific domains. 
 
Diagrammatic Reasoning in the Context of Educational Semiotics 
One of the great discoveries of Charles S. Peirce was the central role of diagrammatic reasoning 
in scientific reasoning as well as the role of representational forms as uncovered in his attempts to 
classify different types of signs. Around the time of his Lowell lectures in 1903 Peirce revised his 
early classification of signs as icons, indexes and symbols into a more complex conception, 
where these types are seen as aspects that can be combined in concrete representations. This is 
why Peirce begins to consider the classification of signs as a problem to be analyzed within a 
“speculative grammar” (Peirce 1903b), i.e. a part of semiotic treating the properties of signs in 
themselves independent of what they might represent. From this perspective the iconic is no 
longer primarily to be understood as a class of “iconic signs” (or “hypoicons” in Peirce’s new 
terminology), but as that aspect of a sign relation by which it can indicate a similarity with an 
object of the sign. In contrast the indexical aspect concerns the causal anchoring of a sign to its 
object in some context, and the symbolic aspect concerns the law-like or conventional regularity 
that might be expressed in the sign and its interpretation. One of Peirce’s own examples in the 
Harvard lectures (Peirce 1903c) is the hygrometer, i.e. a scientific instrument measuring humidity 
of the air. Peirce uses the hygrometer to illustrate the role of the index: the instrument is 
constructed to have a “real relation” to its object and it will react to changes in local humidity. As 
a reactive mechanism it works independent of any observation and interpretation, but in order for 
it to actually convey any information the instrument must also embody “an involved icon” 
(Peirce 1903c). In a modern hygrometer this is the function of the pointer and the scale of the 
instrument interface. Reading the relative humidity (the ratio of water vapor in the air at a given 
temperature) on a hygrometer requires the scale to represent changes in humidity (measured 
indirectly through some other property such as electrical resistance) as corresponding changes in 
the displayed measurement, and this analogical relation is iconic even though points and 
distances on a scale do not “look like” relative humidity. It is important for our topic here to 
recognize that iconicity can be abstract, and the similarity implied should not be confused with a 
subjective judgement of “resemblance”. To complete the hygrometer example it can be added 
that any law-like or conventional regularity of humidity to other phenomena (e.g. temperature) 
expressed by the instrument or our interpretation of it would count as a symbolic aspect. A 
scientific instrument will generally involve all aspects (iconic, indexical and symbolic) of the 
relation of signs to their objects. In the following we will, however, not pursue the derivation of 
Peirce’s extended classification of signs, but focus on his proposed subcategorization of 
hypoicons into images, diagrams and metaphors (Peirce 1903b).  
The subcategorization of iconic signs (“hypoicons”) is important in the context of higher 
education in mathematics, science and engineering, because of the multi-representational 
requirements of communication and research practices in science (cf. our instrument example). 
Specifically we will analyze a few examples associated with the representational form (“sign 
type”) of graphs and the models they represent. Graphs are basically diagrams, but importantly so 
are algebraic expressions, and this points to an operational conception of diagrammatic signs 
beyond their descriptive foundation in similarity relations (Stjernfelt 2010). Graphs and algebra 
are iconic forms associated with “necessary reasoning” (Peirce 1902). Peirce maintained the 
proposition of his father Benjamin Peirce (who was one of the founding fathers of linear algebra) 
that mathematics is “the science which draws necessary conclusions”, but with the modification 
that mathematics deals with “hypothetical state of things” (Peirce 1902). For Peirce diagrammatic 
reasoning is inherently mathematical in this sense of necessary reasoning. 
In the later part of the 20th century diagrammatic reasoning was “rediscovered” by 
cognitive science, and reasoning with diagrams and external representations became a key issue 
in cognitive science starting from the AAAI symposium at Stanford in 1992 (Glasgow, 
Narayanan & Chandrasekaran 1995). However, Peirce’s contribution was largely disregarded at 
the time (Peirce 1903a; 1906). The motivation for this focus on the topic was primarily the 
importance of logic and knowledge representation for artificial intelligence research, and 
secondarily a growing interest within cognitive science in non-linguistic forms of thought and 
reasoning. Peirce was implicated because of his contribution to logic in a narrow sense, i.e. 
disregarding his conception of semiotics. The focus was on e.g. demonstrating the soundness of 
Venn diagrams or Existential Graphs as diagrammatic forms of logical reasoning, but the 
semiotic aspects of diagrammatic reasoning were later reintroduced (Pietarinen 2006, Stjernfelt 
2007). The focus on mathematical logic points to a problem that paradoxically can be seen as 
inherited from Peirce himself: the tension between logical and discursive approaches to sign 
relations and signification. Peirce struggled all his life with this tension between semiotics as a 
logic of reasoning and semiotics as a construction of meaning within different genres and 
domains of discourse (Freadman 2004). The ambiguity that arises for the Existential Graphs 
between an operational iconic logic versus a diagrammatic reasoning with ontological 
implications (Stjernfelt 2011) can be seen as an instance of this general tension.  
The focus here will be on diagrammatic reasoning in the sciences with respect to problems 
of graph and model comprehension in science education. Educational semiotics can be developed 
as a general philosophy of education (Semetsky 2010), but it is argued here that we should 
exploit the opportunity provided by cognitive semiotics (Zlatev 2012) to empirically investigate 
meaning construction and reasoning in educational settings within specific scientific domains.  
 
A Phenomenographic Example from Chemical Engineering Education 
A strange phenomena has been observed in science learning: students who adopt a “surface 
approach” to learning attempt to remember graphs independent of the models they represent. For 
example, when Cartesian graphs are detached from conceptual models and symbolic equations, 
students may attend to shape-features of graphs as if they were images rather than relational 
structures (diagrams). As we shall see in the examples below, this is a problem because different 
versions of the graph-as-image misconception all tend to short-circuit model comprehension. 
Between 1995 and 1997 the author participated in a large scale investigation of problems of 
conceptual understanding in engineering education courses at the Technical University of 
Denmark. The focus was on problems of assessment associated with the use of computational 
exercises and examinations that did not evaluate students’ conceptual understanding. In the 
project students were exposed to concept tests and later interviewed to document their reasoning. 
Concept tests often involved free graph sketching questions rather than computational exercises 
(May 1997). In an advanced course on Transport Processes (mathematical models of the transport 
of mass, energy and momentum in fluid flows) we tested students understanding of concepts and 
models that should be familiar to students on entering the course. One question targeted Fourier’s 
law for heat conduction for a cylinder with a core heated to the temperature T1, with radius R1 
and a flow of heat to the surface with radius R2 and a lower temperature T2. Students were asked 
to sketch the graph T(r) of the temperature against the radius without doing any numerical 
computation. Phenomenographic studies often document a limited number of recurrent 
prototypical misconceptions within a given knowledge domain. A paradigmatic example was the 
analysis of conceptions of the Mole concept in chemistry (Marton, Lybeck, Strömdahl & Tulldal 
1988). In the heat conduction question we found a similar simple distribution: even though 49 
students sketched their own graphs, we only found three types of graphical answers (a, b and c 
below). In interviews we discovered that answers could be motivated in different ways. The 
correct answer is the hyperbolic curve c in Fig. 1. This could reflect an adequate model 
understanding, but it could also arise from vague reasoning or rote learning, where students were 
not able to reconstruct how they came up with the correct answer. 
Fourier’s law for heat conduction can be understood as a law schema (Kuhn 1970) for 
heat flow that has to be specified for each geometry under consideration. Heat flow will be 
proportional to the product of an area and a heat flux through it, i.e. the rate of heat transfer per 
unit surface area. The heat flux will generally have the form – k dT/dx where the constant k is the 
thermal conductivity of the specific material and dT/dx is the temperature gradient. Heat is 
conducted in the direction of decreasing temperature and the flux is therefore negative in the 
positive direction of the x-axis. The linear answer (a) to the question will be appealing to some 
students, because they remember (correctly) that the heat flow through a metal wire can be 
considered as proportional to the temperature gradient over some distance from a heat source 
(Fig. 2). This is however the case for heat flow in one dimension (along the length L), i.e. not 
considering the area of the wire. This is how students are often introduced to heat conduction in 
high school physics. 











Fig. 1. Concept question testing the adaptation of Fourier’s law for (steady-state) heat conduction 
to the special case of a heated cylinder (cross section left) and graph sketching answers of 
students in chemical engineering (right). 
 










Fig. 2. The simple case of heat conduction in a thin metal wire where the linear answer is correct 
is typically the way students have been introduced to Fourier’s law for heat conduction. 
 As stated above Fourier’s law should be understood as a law-schema, i.e. a law that has to be 
specified for any given problem situation in order to be applied (Kuhn 1970), i.e. it has to be 
specified to fit the geometry of each case. In the case of a cylinder with radius r the area is 2 p r L 
and this will affect the temperature curve from T1. In the cylinder the temperature gradient will 
depend on 1/r (Fig. 3) and the graph will be a hyperbolic curve (c in Fig. 1). A model-based 
understanding of the law schema will imply that the graph for T will always have to depend on 
the geometry. Without doing any computations students should be able to reconstruct the 
qualitative graphs for prototypical cases like cuboid (“boxes”), cylindrical and spherical objects.  
This is in itself an example of iconic variation regulated by symbolic constraints and as such a 
form of diagrammatic reasoning, but our focus here is on the nature of the second misconception 
(b in Fig. 1). This answer is different by not having a foundation in the model.  
 
    
Law-schema  
1-D case Cylindrical case
 
Fig. 3. The law-schema of Fourier’s law for heat conduction and its specification in two cases. 
 
In interviews we discovered that students answering b did not attempt to argue with reference to 
the conceptual model or the equations of heat conduction, but rather with a direct reference to 
what particular graphs “looked like” in textbooks. A short interview fragment can illustrate this. 
The student had originally drawn the correct graph (c), but had changed it to (b). 
 
(Interviewer): Can you remember the kind of reasoning that was behind your correction of 
one answer to the other? 
(Student): “The first, uh,… There was a drawing in the foundational textbooks, the one 
called McCabe [Unit Operations of Chemical Engineering] of two heat exchangers… uh, or 
it is one heat exchanger, where that temperature difference …. there are some bended 
curves displayed. And that was, so to speak, the immediate [idea]… if it is something with 
temperature differences, then there are bended curves.” 
(Interviewer): “Hm…” 
(May 1998, Evaluation report, Transport Processes, translated from Danish).  
 
The “immediate idea” that the student forms has no foundation in model comprehension but 
attempts to recall a mental image of graphs of temperature difference as recalled from textbooks, 
or lectures. The student furthermore generate his own heuristic rule: “if it is something with 
temperature differences, then there are bended curved”. This is inadequate in several ways. First 
of all it is an overgeneralization since the graph will depend on the geometry, as we have seen, 
but it is also inadequate by being underspecified (vague), since curves can “bend” in many ways. 
To explore this type of graph comprehension problem in more detail, we will go back briefly to 
the first reporting of this phenomena in cognitive science and educational research.  
 
From Phenomenography to Semiotics 
Under the influence of cognitive science Claude Janvier and John Clement pioneered studies of 
graph comprehension problems in science and mathematics education in the 1980-ies, and they 
identified a “graph-as-picture” misconception in secondary school students (Janvier 1981; 
Clement 1985; Leinhardt, Zaslavsky & Stein 1990). An example is shown in Fig. 4: students 
were asked to sketch the graph of speed as a function of time for a problem situation where a 
bicycle runs down a hill. Some students would draw a graph depicting the problem situation 
visually (Fig. 4) rather than the actual graph of speed over time.    
Clement described this as a mathematical literacy problem, where students apparently 
created a figurative correspondence between visual characteristics of the problem situation (e.g. 
the slope of the hill) and the shape of the graph. Clement reports two versions of the graph-as-
picture misconception. In the bicycle example there is a global correspondence error associated 
with the shape of the graph. In other cases a local visual feature of the sketch of a problem 
situation is seen as corresponding to specific features of a graph. This is called a feature 
correspondence error. In one study students were presented with graphs plotting car speed against 
distance along different racing tracks, and in this case some students established a false 
correspondence between peeks of the graphs and bends of the tracks when asked to infer how 











Fig. 4. A graph-as-picture misconception in school physics redrawn after (Clement 1985).  
 
Graph comprehension will always involve these two levels: a reading of the graph seeing 
and recognizing it as a particular type of representation, and seeing the conceptual model and its 
possible iconic variation in the graph.  These levels have been described in aesthetic philosophy 
of pictures as “seeing as” and “seeing in” (Wollheim 1980; May 1999). 
The focus on the erroneous “dyadic” correspondence between sketches of problem 
situations (as semiotic objects) and graphs (as external representations) will, however, tend to 
hide the triadic nature of the sign relations involved.  Correspondence errors are linked to the 
interpretation of graphs, and we need to focus on the conceptual structures acting as interpretants. 
In our example there is no correspondence error in associating the heat flow graphs with the 
problem situations. University students do not make the mistake of seeing the graphs as directly 
depicting heat flow. The linear answer (a) will usually be a motivated model-based mistake in 
disregarding the geometry. It is motivated in the sense that it is based in a correct reference to 
Fourier’s law (for the linear case), although they forget to modify the law schema according to 
the geometry, whereas the  (b) answer seems to result from failed attempts to remember graph 
features independent of the model or law schema. 
Graphical objects interpreted as graphs will represent relational structures, but what 
happens in answer (b) is that textbook graphs are treated by the perceptual cognitive system as 
images to remember. This is the significant aspect that is overlooked, if we disregard the role of 
triadic sign relations, i.e. the “graph-as-picture” misconception is not generally based in direct 
correspondence errors, but in the cognitive consequences of a desymbolization of diagrams to 
images. It is, in other words, a typological error of a semiotic nature: when a graph is seen as an 
image, students cannot examine the graph and its possible variations in diagrammatic reasoning. 
Thus, the seeing in is lost (seeing the model in the graph). Instead  the graph-image is exposed to 
cognitive operations valid for images such as mental rotation and mirror image formation. These 
operations make sense for images, but not for diagrams here since they should be interpreted as 
graphs representing a model. We can of course perform image-based layout operations on 
diagrams as graphical objects, but only insofar as they do not distort the intended interpretation, 
cf. the infamous examples of misleading 3D perspective rendering of bar graphs (Kosslyn 1993). 
Diagrammatic operations on relational structures in the form of parameter variation is 
involved in the thought experiments essential to model-based comprehension. For example, 
students will change selected terms of an equation to see “what happens if…”. Such mental 
experimentation is a core aspect of Peirce’s notion of diagrammatic reasoning, and it is necessary 
for the individual construction of mental models leading eventually to the conceptual 
understanding “behind” the equations and graphs. Diagrammatic reasoning is necessary for the 
accomplishment of intended learning outcomes in higher education. In the attempt to remember 
graphs based on their graphical features students risk violating significant differences between 
representational forms within “iconic signs”. C.S. Peirce understood algebraic equations as well 
as their graphical expressions as diagrammatic representations resting not only on icons of 
relations but relations aided and regulated by habits of law or convention (i.e. symbols) within 
consistent representational systems (Peirce 1903a, CP 4.418). The desymbolization process 
proposed here (Fig. 5) takes place between different types of iconic signs, i.e. the images, 
diagrams and metaphors indicated in the speculative grammar (Peirce 1903b, EP 2:272-288). In 
exemplifying iconic signs we have to take into account that Peirce’s second classification of signs 
operate on aspects that are combined in concrete signs. For example, we can consider X-ray 
images to be good examples of the image type of iconic signs, but this is only an aspect since X-
ray images are also indexical traces of the objects (e.g. organs, tissues) exposed in the imaging 
process. Furthermore, modern X-ray images are digitally manipulated to enhance desired features 
based on relevant medical and biophysical knowledge, and as such they embody conventional as 
well as natural regularities and will have to be considered as the diagrammatic result of a 
symbolization as well. X-ray images are not simply “images”. They rely on indexical, iconic 
image-like and iconic diagram-like (or even symbolic) features for their intended interpretation. 










Fig. 5. Desymbolization of graphs to graph-images within types of iconicity. Other processes of 
symbolization and desymbolization between iconic signs are possible but not our focus here.  
 
Treating graphs as images degrades an intended inquiry about similarity of relations (at the 
level of  graphs and their underlying models) into an inquiry about similarity of qualities (e.g. 
graphical features of images)1. When Cartesian graphs are handled as images, the operations 
allowed will no longer be constrained symbolically and limited to what is meaningful in the 
model (e.g. Fourier’s law-schema). If the mere shape of the graphs is what is recalled, then the 
                                                          
1 In the extended sign classification (with 10 classes of signs) we might describe this transformation as going from 
genuine graphs as rhematic iconic legisigns to desymbolized graph-images handled as rhematic iconic qualisigns, cf. 
Houser’s classification of models based on types of iconicity (Houser 1991). 
spatial orientation of graph-images and their symbolic interpretation relative to a coordinate 
system tend to be ignored. 
Although mental imagery of 3D objects was an issue in early perceptual psychology since 
the work of Hermann von Helmholtz, the experimental study of mental rotation was first 
introduced by (Shepard & Metzler 1971), and mental rotation of spatial molecular structures is 
now recognized as an important representational competence in domains such as organic 
chemistry (cf. the subdomain of “stereochemistry”). For example, spatial manipulation of 3D 
molecular models is necessary for grasping many spatial problems in chemistry from simple 
isomers (molecules with similar composition but different structure) to complex protein 
structures; but it is significant from a semiotic point of view that some of these diagrammatic 
tasks in chemistry can be performed by alternative symbolic and heuristic means (Stieff 2007). 
Less attention has been paid to the inadvertent effects of 2D mental rotation of Cartesian graphs. 
Recent educational studies in mathematics stress the constructive role of image schemas, 
metaphorical projection and visualization for teaching and learning Cartesian graphs (Font, 
Bolite, & Acevedo 2010), but we should also recognize that “mental imagery” can disturb 
mathematical reasoning (Aspinwall, Shaw & Presmeg 1997) 
It is well known that a graph or diagram in general is never a “direct image of a certain 
reality”, but rather a “figural expression of an already elaborated conceptual structure, like any 
other symbolic system” (Fischbein 1997, p. 157). However, Pierce’s concept of diagrammatic 
reasoning lifts up and important didactic issue, namely, that to understand the model expressed 
by graphs and equations, students need to perform thought experiments and work through the 
possible iconic variation of the graphical forms as expressions of relations in the model (May 
1999).  The confusion of graphs-as-images can also appear in cases where graph representations 
really do “look alike” each other as graphical objects, but where their intended interpretations 
differ because the represented dimensions and units are different. An brief example from physical 
chemistry is given below to show the generality of the phenomenon. 
 
 
An Example from Physical Chemistry 
In chemical reaction kinetics students will learn about the rate of chemical reactions and their 
classification as zero, first, or second order reactions. Reaction orders refer to the exponential 
character of the rate by which chemical reactions depend on substance concentrations. For a 
chemical reaction schematically written2 as aA → bB + cC, and where v is the rate at which the 
substance A is consumed in the process, the rate is given by v = k [A]n where k is a rate constant 
for the specific process and n is an exponent which in simple cases is 0, 1, or 2. For a 0-order 
reaction the reaction rate only depends on the rate constant k and not on the substance 
concentration ([A]0 = 1). In this case the graph of [A] plotted against time t will be a straight line 
expressing the relation: [A] =  −k t +  [A]0, where [A]0 is the initial concentration of A. 
Problems can arise for students because they are often trained in the computation of reaction rates 
before they have a sufficient background in thermodynamics to understand the causal 
mechanisms involved in chemical reactions.  
 
Fig 6. Prototypical plots for zero order and first order chemical reactions. 
                                                          
2 Here the small letters a, b and c are the “stoichiometric” coefficients indicating the number of molecules of a 
substance taking part in a chemical reaction. Large letters A, B and C indicate the substances (reactants and 
products) involved. Chemical notation allows abstraction from a specific chemical process just like a mathematical 
equation can abstract from specific numerical values. 
 This can lead to attempts to remember features of graphs in reaction kinetics detached from the 
underlying models. If students reason with graphs as being simply “linear” or “curved”, as we 
saw in the previous example, this will lead to misinterpretations because the symbolic constraints 
on the graph interpretation in the form of variables and units can be overlooked. Fig.6 shows 
prototypical graphs of zero and first order chemical reactions plotting substance concentrations 
[A] against time, reaction rates against time3, and the natural logarithm of the concentration, 
ln[A], against time (for the first order reaction). The purpose of the logarithmic plot is that it will 
show a linear relation if a reaction is a first order reaction, but not if the reaction is a second order 
reaction. The logarithmic plot is a cognitive artifact in the sense that it imposes a purely symbolic 
transformation on the data that students might obtain in experiments to determine reaction rates 
of a chemical process: the transformation does not produce anything “new”, but it makes certain 
properties of the data visually salient. If the plots, however, are treated in memory as graph-
images rather than symbolically regulated graph-diagrams, the logarithmic plot for ln[A] will 
exhibit a misleading visual similarity with the plot of [A] for a zero order reaction, and they can 
accordingly sometimes be confused. 
 
Conclusion 
Educational research in science should not focus entirely on pedagogical issues or on the 
disciplinary knowledge itself, but should move into the domain of the discursive forms of 
knowledge as expressed in the multiple representational forms utilized in science and their 
different affordances for learning and understanding. Students often have literacy problems in 
working with graphs in science, and graph and model comprehension have to be supported and 
trained explicitly in the form of external representations corresponding to the different (valid) 
cognitive operations on graphs (Vogen, Girwidz, & Engel 2007). Thought experiments and 
working through variations of graphs and models (e.g. parameter variation) within a domain is 
necessary for students’ conceptual understanding. It is also necessary to support and train the 
                                                          
3 This will be a negative differential expression for the substance being consumed, here A, i.e. the concentration of A 
will gradually be reduced by the chemical reaction in which it is used. 
multiple perspectives implied by scientific theories and models as well as the complex 
transformations (conceptual and mathematical) imposed on scientific representations in order to 
modify their affordances for reasoning (Giere 2006; Ainsworth 2006). In modern science the 
complexity of these representational forms, transformations and perspective is considerable, but 
nevertheless we do not pay much attention in university teaching to the “language of science”, 
and to the literacy problems associated with these mathematical, philosophical and semiotic 
aspects of learning scientific domains.  
Looking back at the examples mentioned here, it is clear that we intend high-school 
students to be competent in using Cartesian graphs and associated simple models in e.g. physics 
and chemistry, but in teaching science at a university level we tend to expose students to a 
multitude of representational forms, mathematical transformations and different perspectives on 
theories and models without explicitly addressing this as a literacy issue. Digital and web-based 
technologies seem to provide a foundation for external support of diagrammatic reasoning, but 
we need a cognitive semiotics and didactics of science for the careful analysis of how external 
representations can actually support conceptual understanding.  
Some difficulties in learning science seem to be associated with literacy issues rather than 
real difficulties of the scientific content. The graph-as-image issue exemplifies this. In schools 
some pupils will fail to separate a graph representation of relations from a depiction of the 
problem situation (cf. the bicycle example in Fig. 4), and even if science students at the university 
should be competent in graph reading, they can still be confused about visual similarities between 
graphs that “look alike” although they represent different things (cf. the reaction order graphs in 
Fig. 6). Even students at an advanced level can fall back into learning strategies where they rely 
on mental images of graphs rather than model comprehension (cf. the heat conduction example in 
Fig. 1). The didactic conclusion is that we underestimate the importance of representational 
competences and the need to train students – not just in “learning the content” of their subject 
domains – but also in the multiple representational forms, transformations and perspectives 
appearing at this intersection between didactics, mathematics and semiotics. 
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